Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 48
Number 5 A Taxing War on Poverty: Opportunity
Zones and The Promise of Investment and
Economic Development

Article 9

2021

The National Guard in Title 32 Status: How the Executive's Power
Becomes a City's Crisis
Kevin Winnie

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj

Recommended Citation
Kevin Winnie, The National Guard in Title 32 Status: How the Executive's Power Becomes a City's Crisis,
48 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1287 (2021).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol48/iss5/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

THE NATIONAL GUARD IN TITLE 32 STATUS:
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“In the environment in which Presidents must operate, it is not surprising
that ‘law’ of any kind (the Constitution included) can easily become merely
one more factor to be considered, or even an obstacle to be overcome.”
- Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the
Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1993).
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INTRODUCTION
On January 6, 2021, the United States Capitol was breached and invaded
for the first time since the British set the building ablaze during the War of
1812.1 As far-right protesters raided and desecrated the halls of the
Capitol, the nation watched as federal agents were overcome by the
onslaught of this insistent mob. Despite both its status as one of the most
protected sanctuaries in the United States and ample evidence that this was
a planned invasion,2 the Capitol was not adequately secured. During the
entirety of this attack, the question arose: Where was the National Guard?
Although only a few miles away, the D.C. National Guard (DCNG) was
assigned to traffic control, wholly unprepared for this right-wing invasion.3
After the Capitol’s security was breached, D.C. officials, members of
Congress, and local law enforcement pleaded with the President and
Department of Defense (DoD) to redeploy the DCNG to secure the

1. Amanda Holpuch, US Capitol’s Last Breach Was More than 200 Years Ago,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2021, 7:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jan/06/uscapitol-building-washington-history-breach [https://perma.cc/VR7B-2Y28].
2. Luke Broadwater & Nicholas Fandos, Senate Report Details Security Failures in
Jan.
6
Capitol
Riot,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
12,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/08/us/politics/capitol-riot-security.html
[https://perma.cc/3QKC-JUU6] (“An F.B.I. memo on Jan. 5 warning of people traveling to
Washington for ‘war’ at the Capitol never made its way to top law enforcement officials.”).
3. Paul Sonne, Peter Hermann & Missy Ryan, Pentagon Placed Limits on D.C. Guard
Ahead of Pro-Trump Protests Due to Narrow Mission, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2021, 9:43 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-protests-washington-guardmilitary/2021/01/07/c5299b56-510e-11eb-b2e8-3339e73d9da2_story.html
[https://perma.cc/A5GG-GK99].
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Capitol.4 The executive branch denied this request and also rejected calls
by Governors of both Virginia and Maryland to deploy their National
Guard units.5 Meanwhile, the Capitol was ransacked by far-right rioters,
which resulted in injuries and five fatalities.6 Eventually, hours after the
invasion initially began, the DoD would authorize the National Guard to
assist law enforcement in securing the Capitol.7
The executive branch’s response to these violent protesters stands in
stark contrast to the June 2020 deployment of the National Guard to the
Black Lives Matter (BLM) protest in Washington D.C. At the request of
then-President Trump on June 2, 2020, several governors deployed their
National Guard units to assist the federal government in safeguarding the
capital during the public protests of the George Floyd murder.8 By June 6,
2020, the National Guard’s numbers in D.C. had increased to nearly 5,000
members from 11 states.9 During this deployment, the National Guard
used aggressive tactics to suppress these largely peaceful protests, which
included flying a helicopter right above an active protest.10 This use of outof-state National Guard units was also in opposition to the wishes of
Washington D.C. Mayor Muriel Bowser.11 This June 2021 deployment is

4. Id.
5. Igor Derysh, The Pentagon Denied Multiple Requests to Send National Guard
During Capitol Siege, GOP Governor Says, SALON (Jan. 8, 2021, 2:33 PM),
https://www.salon.com/2021/01/08/the-pentagon-denied-multiple-requests-to-send-nationalguard-during-capitol-siege-gop-governor-says/ [https://perma.cc/R3GQ-FWYN].
6. Richard Read & Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Police and National Guard Prepare for
Attacks on Statehouses as FBI Warns of ‘Armed Protests,’ L.A. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2021, 7:34
AM),
https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-01-13/state-capital-security
[https://perma.cc/L2JG-8VAE].
7. Amanda Macias & Dan Mangan, U.S. Capitol Secured Hours After Pro-Trump
Rioters
Invade
Congress,
CNBC
(Jan.
7,
2021,
7:30
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/01/06/buildings-in-us-capitol-complex-evacuated-amid-protrump-protests.html [https://perma.cc/4P53-BKE4].
8. W.J. Hennigan, Standing Guard, Picking up Trash and Getting Booted from a Hotel.
Inside a Special Forces Unit’s Controversial Deployment to D.C., TIME (June 12, 2020,
5:48 PM), https://time.com/5852608/standing-guard-picking-up-trash-and-getting-bootedfrom-a-d-c-hotel-inside-a-special-forces-units-controversial-deployment-to-dc/
[https://perma.cc/89AC-N3MY].
9. Id. (stating 4,900 National Guard were deployed).
10. Alex Horton et al., A Low-Flying ‘Show of Force,’ WASH. POST (June 23, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/investigations/helicopter-protestswashington-dc-national-guard/ [https://perma.cc/TE8G-ZH6W]. While the DoD
investigation of this incident did not find specific wrongdoing in violation of federal or army
policy, the investigator made several recommendations to train personnel in using
helicopters. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ARMY REGULATION 15-6 INVESTIGATION REPORT
REGARDING USE OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD ROTARY WING ASSETS
FLOWN WITHIN WASHINGTON D.C. ON 1 JUNE 2020 18 (2020).
11. Veronica Stracqualursi & Nicky Robertson, DC Mayor Says She Wants Out-of-State
Troops
‘Out
of
Washington,’
CNN
(June
4,
2020,
3:29
PM),
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distinct to January 2021, when Mayor Bowser pleaded with the executive12
to deploy out-of-state units to protect the Capitol.13
The glaring dissimilarities between the deployments of the National
Guard during each of these incidents reveal the executive’s broad
discretion to utilize these troops in opposition to local wishes. And yet, this
executive authority is complicated considering the National Guard is
innately a state entity under a state governor’s control unless federalized by
the executive branch.14 Throughout these crises, the National Guard was
not federalized, yet the executive’s authority reigned supreme in deciding
whether to use the National Guard.15 Although the executive has direct
authority over the DCNG,16 the President does not have such control over
out-of-state units, yet decided during each incident whether to authorize the
use of out-of-state Guard units. The basis of this executive power to

https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/04/politics/dc-mayor-federal-troops-floydprotests/index.html [https://perma.cc/K97A-4YPR]; see also Emily Badger & Katie Benner,
Why Washington’s Streets Have Filled with Troops the Mayor Did Not Want, N.Y. TIMES
(June 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/04/upshot/george-floyd-protests-dcstatehood.html [https://perma.cc/M9VU-X9E7] (stating the D.C. Mayor requested the
District of Columbia’s National Guard from the Trump administration and was specifically
upset about federal agents and out-of-state National Guard units deployed throughout the
capital).
12. This Note uses the term “executive” to broadly refer to the executive branch, yet this
Note will mostly use this term in reference to the President, DoD, and Department of
Justice, which are the main executive actors involved in utilizing the military and, more
specifically, the National Guard.
13. Robinson Woodward-Burns, The Best Way to Secure the Capitol Is to Make D.C. A
State,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
13,
2021,
11:34
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/01/13/dc-national-guard-bowser-capitolriot-statehood/ [https://perma.cc/7JGC-ZAH3].
14. See, e.g., ARMY NAT’L GUARD, NATIONAL GUARD FACT SHEET ARMY NATIONAL
GUARD (FY 2005) 3 (2006), https://www.nationalguard.mil/About-the-Guard/ArmyNational-Guard/Resources/News/ARNG-Media/FileId/137011/
[https://perma.cc/47LS7FWN].
15. See Helene Cooper et al., As the D.C. Police Clear the Capitol Grounds, the Mayor
Extends
a
Public
Emergency,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
6,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/us/politics/national-guard-capitolarmy.html?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur [https://perma.cc/4979-RP79] (finding the
executive branch rejected initial request to deploy the National Guard in January 2021);
Paul Sonne, Fenit Nirappil & Josh Dawsey, Pentagon Disarms National Guard Activated in
D.C., Sends Active-Duty Forces Home, WASH. POST (June 5, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/pentagon-disarms-guardsmen-inwashington-dc-in-signal-of-de-escalation/2020/06/05/324da91a-a733-11ea-86817d471bf20207_story.html [https://perma.cc/8TBS-7W7W] (finding former Secretary of
Defense Esper commanded the National Guard to serve unarmed and leave the capital by a
certain date).
16. D.C. Code § 49-409 (2020) (“The President of the United States shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of the militia of the District of Columbia.”).
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authorize and deploy the National Guard is found in one statute: 32 U.S.C.
§ 502(f) (Section 502(f)).17
Section 502 does not ostensibly provide the executive an ability to
deploy a state’s National Guard until one closely reads subsection 502(f).18
Although titled “Required drills and field exercises,” which does not
explicitly suggest the executive can use the National Guard in thwarting
civil protest or insurrection, subsection 502(f) may provide a broad
delegation of power to the executive. Pursuant to Section 502(f), “a
member of the National Guard may . . . be ordered to perform training or
other duty” under regulations by the Secretary of the Army or Air Force,
which may include “[s]upport of operations or missions . . . at the request
of the President or Secretary of Defense.”19 Based upon this power to
request the National Guard, can the President authorize these troops to
perform any mission or operation under Section 502(f)?
Examining their use of National Guard units under Section 502(f), the
executive branch would seem to answer this question in the affirmative.
The National Guard operating under Section 502(f) is in Title 32 status, in
which the guard is controlled by their respective state yet funded by the
federal government.20 The executive branch, under both guidance from the
DoD and the Department of Justice,21 has utilized a broad interpretation of
Section 502(f) to deploy the National Guard in Title 32 status to execute
various operational missions on behalf of the executive branch.22 Such
operations seem far remote from the training seemingly described in
Section 502. Operating under Section 502(f), the National Guard assisted
in the aftermath of both the September 11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina,23

17. See Letter from William Barr, Att’y Gen., U.S. Off. of the Att’y Gen., to Muriel
Bowser, Mayor, D.C., & Karl A. Racine, Att’y Gen., D.C. (June 9, 2020),
https://twitter.com/KerriKupecDOJ/status/1270487263324049410/photo/2
[https://perma.cc/886J-BSVF]; see also Press Release, Nat’l Guard, National Guard
Response to Civil Unrest (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.nationalguard.mil/Resources/PressReleases/Article/2466269/national-guard-response-to-civil-unrest/ [https://perma.cc/DJY9EQF4] (“Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller approved up to 6,200 National
Guardsmen to support civil authorities in the District of Columbia for up to 31 days under
Title 32, 502(f) authority.”).
18. 32 U.S.C. § 502.
19. Id.
20. TIMOTHY J. LOWENBERG, NAT’L GUARD ASS’N OF THE U.S., THE ROLE OF THE
NATIONAL GUARD IN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY 2 (2005).
21. See infra Section I.B; see also Authority to Use Troops to Prevent Interference with
Federal Employees by Mayday Demonstrations and Consequent Impairment of Government
Functions, 1 Op. O.L.C. 343 (Apr. 29, 1971), https://www.justice.gov/file/20836/download
[https://perma.cc/4DKS-SPF9].
22. See infra Section II.B.ii.
23. ARMY NAT’L GUARD, NATIONAL GUARD HOMELAND DEFENSE WHITE PAPER:
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, HURRICANE KATRINA, AND BEYOND 3–5 (2005) [hereinafter WHITE
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and, more recently, provided assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic by
establishing testing centers and administering the vaccine to state
residents.24 DoD instructions even cite Section 502(f) to authorize the
National Guard to support “special events.”25 Based on this extensive use
of the National Guard under Section 502(f), the executive’s interpretation
of this provision seems to be limitless in scope and unrestrained by any
other statutory provision.26
Although flexible use of the National Guard can be helpful in
responding to novel emergencies, President Trump’s rhetoric and actions
regarding the National Guard demonstrate a need for legal restraints on this
broad executive power. In light of nationwide BLM protests, President
Trump called upon governors to deploy their National Guard units to
suppress protest in major cities and, if they did not, threatened to deploy the
federal military.27 On June 2, 2020, the White House ordered troops,
including National Guard units, to clear BLM demonstrators protesting on
Lafayette Square,28 an event considered outrageous by former military

PAPERS],
https://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/
Documents/ARNGpdfs/whitepages/HLD%20White%20Paper_11OCT05_Final_
Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ECV-HWM6].
24. E.g., Memorandum on Providing Continued Federal Support for Governors’ Use of
the National Guard to Respond to COVID-19 and To Facilitate Economic Recovery, 85
Fed. Reg. 31,665 (2020); see Press Release, Nat’l Guard Bureau, National Guard Active in
Multiple Response Efforts (Aug. 27, 2020) [hereinafter Nat’l Guard Bureau, Multiple
Response
Efforts],
https://www.nationalguard.mil/Resources/PressReleases/Article/2327309/national-guard-active-in-multiple-response-efforts/
[https://perma.cc/LYN8-Q9PR] (stating that National Guard units have created mobile
testing teams while “over 19,600 National Guard professionals continue COVID-19
response efforts in all 50 states, three territories and the District of Columbia”); see also
Donald Branum, Vermont National Guard Rolls Out 1st Doses of COVID Vaccine, NAT’L
GUARD (Jan. 5, 2021), https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2462445/vermontnational-guard-rolls-out-1st-doses-of-covid-vaccine/ [https://perma.cc/JQX7-U368] (stating
the National Guard has also helped administer the COVID-19 vaccine); Holli Nelson, West
Virginia National Guard Helps Ramp up COVID-19 Testing, NAT’L GUARD (Nov. 13,
2020), https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/2414557/west-virginia-national-guardhelps-ramp-up-covid-19-testing/
[https://perma.cc/VMF8-GXDP]
(“Guard
members . . . have been working around the clock [to] establish locations, advertise testing
and collect test samples. In 13 days, 150,109 tests were conducted.”).
25. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ISSUANCE 3025.20, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF SPECIAL EVENTS para.
4
(2012)
[hereinafter
DODI
3025.20],
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/302520p.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QHJ7-XGA7] (updated May 24, 2017).
26. See infra Section I.B.
27. W.J. Hennigan & John Walcott, Pulled into Yet Another Political Battle, the
Pentagon Finally Pushes Back Against Trump, TIME (June 3, 2020, 3:27 PM),
https://time.com/5846978/trump-military-protests/ [https://perma.cc/5F3N-F3GG].
28. Rebecca Tan et al., Before Trump Vows to End “Lawlessness,” Federal Officers
Confront Protestors Outside White House, WASH. POST (June 2, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/washington-dc-protest-white-house-george-
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personnel.29 In the following days, Trump’s threats would continue when,
after protests erupted over another shooting in Kenosha, Wisconsin, he
threatened to send the National Guard into the city.30 Although President
Trump did not state under which authority he would do so, this Note argues
that the President, under Section 502(f), could deploy out-of-state units to a
city and disregard local objections.31 President Trump’s statements
surrounding the National Guard did not indicate restraint in deploying these
units, urging a need to investigate the extent of this executive power.
Based on President Trump’s more recent refusal to deploy National Guards
units to the Capitol in January 2021,32 granting the executive such broad
discretion to reject the request of deployment is equally dangerous when
lives are at stake. Given both President Trump’s rhetoric and the
executive’s broad interpretation of Section 502(f), this Note challenges the
executive’s interpretation of Section 502(f) by investigating this statute’s
meaning through tools of statutory interpretation.
This Note also argues that to allow the executive’s unrestricted use of
the National Guard under Section 502(f) is a problem for local
municipalities and citizens directly affected by such deployments. First,
unlike the federal military, the National Guard under Title 32 status can
conduct law enforcement activity. Such units are not subject to the Posse
Comitatus Act (PCA), which prohibits the use of “the Army or the Air
Force . . . to execute the laws.”33 Second, as there is no positive law to

floyd/2020/06/01/6b193d1c-a3c9-11ea-bb20-ebf0921f3bbd_story.html
[https://perma.cc/HJL5-MYBU] (“Hundreds of protestors were pushed away from Lafayette
Square, where they were protesting the police killing of George Floyd, by the National
Guard, U.S. Park Police and Secret Service.”). Former Secretary of Defense Mark Esper
stated that National Guard was not directly involved the actual clearing of protesters rather
they remained as back up. See National Guard ‘Did Not Advance’ on Crowd at Lafayette
Park: Esper, YAHOO! NEWS (July 9, 2020), https://news.yahoo.com/national-guard-did-notadvance-195115879.html [https://perma.cc/GP7D-USVU].
29. See Mike Mullen, I Cannot Remain Silent: Our Fellow Citizens Are Not the Enemy,
and
Must
Never
Become
So,
ATLANTIC
(June
2,
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/american-cities-are-notbattlespaces/612553/ [https://perma.cc/8MS7-YXTB].
30. See Calvin Woodward & Scott Bauer, AP FACT CHECK: Trump Tweets Distort
Truth on National Guard, ASSOC. PRESS (Sept. 1, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/ap-topnews-or-state-wire-politics-wi-state-wire-2ea05933a91212ccfb1a3ae4c39e0e79
[https://perma.cc/Q4CQ-HT5V]; see also Christina Morales, What We Know About the
Shooting
of
Jacob
Blake,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
26,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/jacob-blake-shooting-kenosha.html
[https://perma.cc/4RDJ-8NVZ].
31. See infra Section III.A.
32. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1385; see also NAT’L GUARD BUREAU, REGULATION 500-5, NATIONAL
GUARD DOMESTIC LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT AND MISSION ASSURANCE OPERATIONS,
para.
4-3(b)
(2010)
[hereinafter
NGR
500-5],
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restrict the President in his use of Title 32 National Guard troops, the
executive could send such forces into cities in opposition to local
authorities.34 While a governor’s consent to use its National Guard in Title
32 status is legally mandated,35 there is no law that requires the President to
receive local permission prior to deploying out-of-state National Guard
units into a municipality. This lack of restraints is particularly troublesome
for Washington D.C. as the President has direct authority over the DCNG
and can request out-of-state units into the capital. Finally, although state
governors could theoretically provide an adequate limitation on the
executive’s use of their state’s National Guard by denying a President’s
request, this requirement is an insufficient restraint given the financial and
procedural incentives to approve deployment in Title 32 status.
This Note contributes to scholarship by understanding the legal claims
that underlie the broad, nearly limitless executive use of the National Guard
in their Title 32 capacity. In Part I, this Note traces the origins of the
National Guard from its conception as a state-based militia to its modern
role as a domestic operational force. Part I will also investigate the
executive’s extensive use of Title 32 units based on its broad interpretation
of Section 502(f). In Part II, this Note seeks to challenge the executive’s
reading of Section 502(f) by exploring this statute’s meaning through tools
of statutory interpretation. Finding the statute’s meaning ambiguous, this
Note argues that the Supreme Court would defer to the executive’s
interpretation of Section 502(f). In Part III, whereas prior work has praised
the flexible standard surrounding the use of Title 32 National Guard
troops,36 this Note argues that permitting the executive an almost
unbounded use of such units is problematic given the lack of statutory
restrictions and ineffectual checks on the executive’s power. Section III
explores how allocating such power to the executive is detrimental to local
cities, especially Washington D.C., as the executive can disregard local
authorities and deploy out-of-state National Guard units without their
approval. In Part IV, this Note contends that Congress can limit the
executive’s power by amending Section 502(f) and granting the D.C.
Mayor the same authority over the DCNG as other governors possess over
their state’s guard.
https://www.ngbpmc.ng.mil/Portals/27/Publications/ngr/ngr%20500-5.pdf?ver=2018-09-07082540-767 [https://perma.cc/6JRK-DKJN] (“National Guard members called to state
active duty or in a Title 32 status . . . do not come under the restrictions imposed by the
Posse Comiatus Act.”).
34. See infra Section III.A.
35. 32 U.S.C. § 328.
36. See generally Christopher R. Brown, Been There, Doing That in a Title 32 Status:
The National Guard Now Authorized to Perform Its 400-Year Old Domestic Mission in Title
32 Status, 2008 ARMY L. 23 (2008).
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I. THE NATIONAL GUARD: FROM STATE MILITIA TO
FEDERAL ASSET
A. From Local Militia to Domestic Operational Force
The National Guard originates from the long-standing tradition of
organized local militias.37 In the United States, militias were a fundamental
component of the first colonies that relied on such units during the
American Revolution.38 During the Constitutional Convention, the
founders recognized the importance of militias yet debated where the
authority to control such groups should lie.39 On one side, the Federalists
advocated for centralized control by the federal government.40 On the
other, the Anti-Federalists distrusted the national government and
advocated for state authority over the militia.41 The Anti-Federalists placed
great emphasis on militias as the principal weapons to check the
“potentially arbitrary power of the central government.”42 The two sides
compromised with a dual system that is enshrined in the Militia Clauses in
which Congress has the authority to organize, arm, and discipline the
militia while states would appoint officers and train these soldiers.43 In

37. JOHN K. MAHON, HISTORY OF THE MILITIA AND THE NATIONAL GUARD 6–7 (Louis
Morton ed., 1983) (tracing the use of citizen soldiers in the United States back to the Middle
Ages of Europe).
38. See MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A BIOGRAPHY 8 (2014)
(explaining that the First colonist organized militias at Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay
Colonies).
39. Id. at 22–23. Two sides were torn as one “yearned for an effective national force, yet
felt protective of the state militias, and were eager to profess their continued fealty to the
ideal.” Id. at 22.
40. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The power of regulating the
militia, and of commanding its services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural
incidents to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching over the
internal peace of the Confederacy.”). But see THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison)
(arguing that the final authority of government and governmental power reside in the
people).
41. Luther Martin, The Genuine Information at the Legislature of the State of Maryland
(Dec. 28, 1787), https://www.consource.org/document/luther-martin-genuine-information1787-12-28/ [https://perma.cc/4EVA-6YAH] (arguing that states were in a better position to
understand the “situation and circumstances of their citizens, and the regulations that would
be necessary and sufficient to effect a well-regulated militia in each”).
42. MAHON, supra note 37, at 48.
43. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o provide for
calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions[.]”); id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 16 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as
may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively,
the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the
discipline prescribed by Congress[.]”).
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doing so, Congress, not the President, was given the power to call forth the
state militias into federal services for three reasons: to execute the laws of
the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasion.44
While Congress passed two acts to regulate the militia in 1792, the states
would primarily control these entities and would continue to do so until
1903 when, after the Spanish-American War, the federal government
passed the Dick Act to reinvigorate the militias.45 The Dick Act officially
christened the militias as “National Guards”46 and marked a beginning of
increasing and continuous federal control over the militias.47 The Dick Act
allocated federal funds for equipment and training and permitted the
President to order a fixed number of militiamen to serve as reserves during
wartime.48 From this point onward, the National Guard’s role in United
States military affairs would grow.49
The federal government would continue to regulate the National Guard
transitioning these units from a local force into a reserve for the federal
army on an as-needed basis.50 After World War I, Congress would solidify
the National Guard’s status as a federal reserve force.51 Congress’s 1933
amendment to the National Defense Act of 1916 granted the President the
power to federalize the National Guard when Congress declared a national

44. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15.
45. MAHON, supra note 37, at 138–39; see also MICHAEL D. DOUBLER & JOHN W.
LISTMAN JR., THE NATIONAL GUARD: AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF AMERICA’S CITIZENSOLDIERS 53–54 (2d. ed. 2007). President Roosevelt exclaimed that the “militia law is
obsolete and worthless.” Theodore Roosevelt, President, First Annual Message to Congress
(Dec. 3, 1901) (transcript available in the University of Virginia Miller Center). George
Washington felt similarly about the militia during the Revolutionary War stating, “to place
any dependence upon Militia, is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff.” WALDMAN, supra
note 38, at 14. In fact, many state militias fell into decay from the War of 1812 onward. See
DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 45, at 22–23. While some states abolished mandatory
service, others eliminated their militias altogether. See id.
46. The Militia Act of 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-33, § 3, 32 Stat. 775 (1903) (also known as
the Dick Act); see also ELBRIDGE COLBY, THE NATIONAL GUARD OF THE UNITED STATES: A
HALF CENTURY OF PROGRESS I-1 (1977) (explaining that the term “National Guard” was
used in some states and is thought to have originated during a visit to the United States by
Marquis de Lafayette in 1824).
47. MAHON, supra note 37, at 139.
48. The Militia Act of 1903 § 3.
49. See RAPHAEL S. COHEN, DEMYSTIFYING THE CITIZEN SOLIDER 16 (2015),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1141.html [https://perma.cc/6PZQ-6CSR]
(finding that the Dick Act and subsequent reforms led to the increasing role of the National
Guard in the United States’s national security).
50. Id.
51. DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 45, at 68, 72 (explaining that the National Defense
Act of 1933 established the National Guard as a permanent reserve component).
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emergency.52 Representative of the growing federal control was the
mandate calling for National Guard troops to take a dual oath to both the
nation and their state.53 In the 1970s and after the Vietnam War, the DoD
announced the Total Force Policy that would “fully integrate their active
and reserve forces into a ‘homogenous whole.’”54 The Total Force Policy
incorporated the National Guard into the military reserve and established
the National Guard as the sole reserve for federal forces.55 As a result of
the Total Force Policy, the National Guard was brought into closer
harmony with the active army.56
After the conclusion of the Gulf War, the National Guard’s role shifted
again from a reserve force to an operational unit, which would further
integrate the National Guard into the military in order to be readily utilized
for any major conflict.57 Unlike its previous status as a reserve force, this
operational status transitioned the National Guard into a perennial asset for
national security.58 Starting in the 1990s, the National Guard would
respond to major domestic emergencies, including suppressing civil unrest
during the 1992 Rodney King riots in Los Angeles and aiding towns during
major flooding along the Mississippi River.59 In the aftermath of the
September 11 terrorist attacks, the National Guard provided both local
support in New York City, from arranging medical treatment to aiding law
enforcement, and nationwide assistance in securing commercial airports
and the U.S. borders.60 While heavily involved domestically, the National
Guard also served abroad, participating in both the Iraq and Afghanistan
Wars.61 In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the National Guard
was deployed to perform rooftop rescues and deliver supplies via
helicopter.62 Perhaps the largest domestic deployment of the National
Guard was during 2020 when, at one point, 63,000 guard members were

52. See MAHON, supra note 37, at 174–75 (explaining the importance of this authority
since, prior to this amendment, the National Guard would be dissolved from their units and
drafted individually. Now units would remain intact while in federal service).
53. DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 45, at 73.
54. Id. at 116.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See COHEN, supra note 49, at 22.
58. See id. at 29.
59. DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 45, at 126.
60. See Richard H. Kohn, Using the Military at Home: Yesterday, Today, and
Tomorrow, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 165, 172–73 (2003).
61. COHEN, supra note 49, at 24.
62. WHITE PAPERS, supra note 23, at 3–4.
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active in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, civil disturbances, and
other natural disasters, including the California wildfires.63
B. The Broad Modern Executive Use of the National Guard
i. Title 32 Status: Procedural Requirements
The National Guard can serve in one of three distinct statuses: State
Active Duty, Title 32 status, or Title 10 status.64 Determining the National
Guard’s status among these three statuses is important as each determines
the authority in charge and whether the guard is limited by federal or state
law.65 The Supreme Court aptly outlined the National Guard’s status: “In a
sense, [National Guard members] must keep three hats in their closets — a
civilian hat, a state militia hat, and an army hat — only one of which is
worn at any particular time.”66 In this Section, this Note will outline
procedural requirements that must be completed prior to the National
Guard deploying under Title 32 status.
Although the National Guard is inherently a state entity, these units may
act in three distinct contexts: as a purely state force in State Active Duty
(SAD); as a federal force under Title 10 (Title 10 status); and as state force
used for federal operations in Title 32 status.67 In SAD status, the National
Guard is directly controlled by the governor and paid for by the state.68
The National Guard in Title 10 status is fully controlled by the federal
government and integrated into the military.69 Yet, while in Title 32 status,
the National Guard is a state force funded by the federal government and
utilized for operational support by either the federal or state governments.70
63. Nat’l Guard Bureau, Multiple Response Efforts, supra note 24 (stating that National
Guard units have created mobile testing teams while “over 19,600 National Guard
professionals continue COVID-19 response efforts in all 50 states, three territories and the
District of Columbia”); see also National Guard Continues Wildfire Operation, ASS’N U.S.
ARMY (Sept. 24, 2020, 2:06 PM), https://www.ausa.org/news/national-guard-continueswildfire-operations [https://perma.cc/PJ5L-VVL3] (stating the California National Guard
used helicopters to dump water and suppress fires).
64. See LOWENBERG, supra note 20, at 2–3.
65. See CTR. FOR L. & MIL. OPERATIONS, DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK FOR
JUDGE ADVOCATES 48–49 (2018) [hereinafter DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK],
https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/domestic-law-handbook-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G9DG-RGYS] (“Status is also the primary factor for determining the
applicability of law for such issues as benefits, protections, and liabilities.”).
66. Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 348 (1990).
67. See LOWENBERG, supra note 20, at 2–3.
68. Id. at 2.
69. Id. at 2–3 (“When employed at home or abroad in Title 10 status, National Guard
forces are stripped of all state control and become indistinguishable elements of the federal
military force.”).
70. Id.
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Furthermore, in either SAD or Title 32 status, the National Guard is not
subject to the PCA, which allows these units to enforce domestic law.71
The Title 32 Status represents the unique role that the National Guard plays
in the American federalist structure as units are under the command of the
states but are funded by the federal government.72
Before operating under Title 32 status, this duty status must be approved
by the executive branch and the state governor. The approval of Title 32
status may occur in three ways. First, a governor may request to deploy the
National Guard in Title 32 status with the consent of the proper
Departmental Secretary.73 Second, the DoD can prescribe regulations to
authorize Title 32 status.74 Third, the President or Secretary of Defense can
specifically request a governor to deploy their National Guard for training
or “other duty.”75 In any case, both the governor and the executive branch
must concur over the deployment of the National Guard units in Title 32
status.
ii. The Executive’s Modern Use of National Guard
Units in Title 32 Status
Since the National Guard’s transition to an operational force in the
1990s,76 the federal government has authorized the National Guard in Title
32 status to conduct homeland security missions at the discretion of the
executive branch. Responding to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the
National Guard was deployed in Title 32 status across the nation.77

71. See Gilbert v. United States, 165 F.3d 470, 473 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Hutchings, 127 F.3d 1255, 1258 (10th Cir. 1997); see also NGR 500-5, supra note 33, para.
4-3(b) (“National Guard members called to state active duty or in a Title 32 status . . . do not
come under the restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act.”).
72. See LOWENBERG, supra note 20, at 2 (“These provisions are unique to the National
Guard.”).
73. 32 U.S.C. § 328 (“The Governor of a State or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
Guam, or the Virgin Islands, or the commanding general of the District of Columbia
National Guard, as the case may be, with the consent of the Secretary concerned, may order
a member of the National Guard to perform Active Guard and Reserve duty, as defined by
section 101(d)(6) of title 10, pursuant to section 502(f) of this title [32 USCS § 502(f)].”).
74. See 32 U.S.C. § 502(f)(1).
75. Id. § 502(f)(2); see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ISSUANCE 3025.22, THE USE OF
NATIONAL GUARD FOR DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES para. 3-d (2013)
[hereinafter
DODI
3025.22],
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents
/DD/issuances/dodi/302522p.pdf?ver=2019-02-13-093838-733
[https://perma.cc/6F92XE9W] (“The use of the National Guard to support a federal department or agency or
qualifying entity request for assistance will only be conducted in a duty status . . . unless
otherwise authorized by the Secretary of Defense.” (emphasis added)) (updated May 15,
2017).
76. See supra Section I.A.
77. WHITE PAPERS, supra note 23, at 3.
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Following the September 11 attacks, the executive has provided that the
National Guard can be used to support the security of “National Special
Security Events.”78 This has included the National Guard supporting
security efforts at the 2002 Winter Olympics in Utah, the 2004 G-8 summit
in Georgia, and both the 2004 Democrat and Republican National
Conventions in Boston and New York City, respectively.79
In 2007, Congress officially amended Title 32 to permit the National
Guard to “support or execute homeland defense activities.”80 Homeland
defense activity means duty taken “for the military protection of the
territory or domestic population of the United States . . . determined by the
Secretary of Defense.”81 Although not explicitly citing this statutory
provision in authorizing homeland security missions, each presidential
administration since George W. Bush has authorized the National Guard in
Title 32 status to support the Department of Homeland Security in
monitoring the southern border.82 While deployed to the border, the
National Guard was not authorized to make arrests,83 yet supported Border
Patrol in “operating surveillance systems, analyzing intelligence, installing
fences and vehicle barriers, building patrol roads and providing training.”84
The National Guard also identified individuals attempting to enter the

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 5–6.
32 U.S.C. § 904(a).
Id. § 901.
See R. CHUCK MASON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41286, SECURING AMERICA’S
BORDERS: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY 2 (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41286.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MJY4-T4PV] (discussing President Obama’s deployment of National
Guard to the border, known as Operation Phalanx); Presidential Memorandum from
President Donald J. Trump for the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the
Secretary
of
Homeland
Security
(Apr.
4,
2018),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandumsecretary-defense-attorney-general-secretary-homeland-security/ [https://perma.cc/XLS6BNWL] (President Trump’s request to deploy National Guard troops to the border);
MICHAEL D. DOUBLER, NAT’L GUARD BUREAU, OPERATION JUMP START: THE NATIONAL
GUARD ON THE SOUTHWEST BORDER, 2006-2008 19 (2008) [hereinafter DOUBLER REPORT],
https://www.nationalguard.mil/portals/31/Documents/About/Publications/Documents/Opera
tion%20Jump%20Start.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HT88-GNJ5]
(discussing
the
Bush
Administration’s use of the National Guard at the border).
83. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10121, THE PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY
TO USE THE NATIONAL GUARD OR THE ARMED FORCES TO SECURE THE BORDER 2 (2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/LSB10121.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7VY-6QGS] (“Although
National Guard members did not engage in direct law enforcement activities during these
two border security operations [under the Bush and Obama Administrations], it is possible
that states might consider giving them that authority in future operations.”).
84. DOUBLER REPORT, supra note 82, at 18.
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United States and relayed such information to Border Patrol to make
arrests.85
With a growing domestic role, the National Guard has been used by the
executive to assist in recovery efforts for major national disasters. While
assisting in the Hurricane Katrina recovery efforts, the National Guard
operated in a Title 32 status.86 Once considered the largest statewide
deployment of the National Guard, over 50,000 guard members were
deployed to assist in responding to the local disaster.87 In the aftermath of
the hurricane, the National Guard worked on construction projects,
provided logistical support by flying supplies to areas with restricted
access, and performed rescues across hurricane-stricken areas.88 Since
Hurricane Katrina, the National Guard has continued to respond to
emergencies arising from natural disasters in Title 32 status.89 More
recently, the National Guard was used to respond to the California wildfire
and assisted in suppressing these forest-wide fires through helicopter water
dumps.90
iii. The Executive’s Broad Interpretation of Section 502(f)
Section 502(f) is the central statutory authorization for the National
Guard to perform or conduct domestic operational missions under Title 32
status.91 Specifically, Section 502(f)(1) permits the Secretary of the Army
or Secretary of the Air Force to prescribe regulations that may order the
National Guard “to perform training or other duty.”92 Contrasting with the
training requirements of Section 502(a), the DoD recognizes that Section

85. See Letter from Davi M. D’Agostino, Dir., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., to Carl
Levin, U.S. Sen., & Howard P. “Buck” McKeon, U.S. Rep. 18 (Sept. 12, 2011).
86. WHITE PAPERS, supra note 23, at 12.
87. Id. at 4.
88. Id. at 4–5.
89. See
NAT’L
GUARD
BUREAU,
2015
POSTURE
STATEMENT
36,
https://www.nationalguard.mil/portals/31/Documents/PostureStatements/2015%20National
%20Guard%20Bureau%20Posture%20Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/236G-TXCT] (last
visited Oct. 6, 2021) (“National Guard Soldiers and Airmen logged nearly 452,100 duty
days (in state active duty and Title 32 status) in response to state emergencies in FY13.”);
NAT’L
GUARD
BUREAU,
2016
POSTURE
STATEMENT
11,
https://www.nationalguard.mil/portals/31/Documents/PostureStatements/2016%20National
%20Guard%20Bureau%20Posture%20Statement.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CEZ-EKTG] (last
visited Oct. 6, 2021) (“Army and Air National Guardsmen were called-up (in state active
duty and Title 32 status) by their governors 200 times and logged 281,263 man days
responding to homeland incidents in FY14. Part of those responses included 63 natural
disasters; including 17 fires, 14 winter storms, 12 tornadoes, 12 floods and 3 hurricanes.”).
90. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
91. WHITE PAPER, supra note 23, at 12.
92. 32 U.S.C. § 502(f)(1).
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502(f) provides distinct responsibilities and duties to the National Guard. 93
Under Section 502(a), the National Guard is primarily in a training status,94
whereas, under Section 502(f), the National Guard can conduct training or
perform other duties.95 This has two important ramifications for the
National Guard acting pursuant to Section 502(f) status.
First, the executive allows the National Guard under Section 502(f) to
satisfy training requirements while performing an operational mission.
Training under Section 502(f) is not interchangeable with training under
Section 502(a).96 While Section 502(a) operational assistance may occur
incidental to training, Section 502(f) training may occur accompanying
active duty.97 For example, while deployed to the southern border under
Section 502(f), National Guard troops were supporting an operational
mission while also satisfying training requirements.98 National Guard units
training under Section 502(a) can only provide operational support when
there is “incidental benefit” to civil authorities.99 For example, a National
Guard mobile hospital unit deployed for training can be diverted to support
a local emergency. Since the training is consequentially supporting another
operation, this unit’s actions are authorized under Section 502(a).100
Second, unlike Section 502(a), Section 502(f) states that the National
Guard can operate pursuant to “other duty” prescribed by DoD regulations
or as requested by the President or Secretary of Defense.101 In interpreting
this “other duty,” the executive indicates that Section 502(f) creates an
independent duty for National Guard units, which is not limited by other

93. DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 65, at 198. (“[S]tatus under
Section 502(a) is materially different from status under Section 502(f) in both purpose and
approval authority.”).
94. Id.
95. See 32 U.S.C. § 502(f); see also DOUBLER REPORT, supra note 82, at 7 (explaining
that while deployed to the Mexico border, National Guard troops were training as well as
participating on an operational mission).
96. OFF. OF THE CHIEF GEN. COUNS., NAT’L GUARD BUREAU, DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
LAW AND POLICY 66 (2019) [hereinafter NGB DOMESTIC GUIDANCE]. Handbooks and
publications can be used as guidance for determining an agency’s interpretation of a statute.
See, e.g., S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Env’t Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 377 (2006) (citing the
EPA’s Water Quality Standards Handbook); FCC v. Am. Broad. Co., 347 U.S. 284, 294
(1954) (citing publications by the Post Office and Department of Justice to discover the
agency’s interpretation of a statutory language).
97. NGB DOMESTIC GUIDANCE, supra note 96, at 70.
98. DOUBLER REPORT, supra note 82, at 47 (explaining that while deployed to the U.S.Mexico border, National Guard troops were training as well as participating on an
operational mission).
99. NGB DOMESTIC GUIDANCE, supra note 96, at 68.
100. Id. at 68–69.
101. 32 U.S.C. § 502(f).
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statutory provisions.102 Specifically, the National Guard Bureau (NGB)103
suggests that Section 502(f) duty permits the National Guard to conduct
missions other than those explicitly authorized by statutes.104 Therefore,
although there are particular statutes that cite Section 502(f) to authorize
specific missions for Title 32 National Guard units, the NGB has
promulgated instructions that suggest Section 502(f) can allow operations
and missions beyond those explicitly permitted by law. Pursuant to the
independent duty, DoD Issuance permits the National Guard under Section
502(f) to support “international and domestic special events.”105 These
special events may include supporting security efforts at a President’s State
of the Union address, the Olympics, or the Boy Scout Jamboree.106 In
supporting such events, the National Guard could provide support through
aviation, security, logistics, or nuclear threat identification.107 Unlike
homeland security and counter-drug missions, there is no legislation that
specifically authorizes the National Guard to support these special events.
In accordance with this broad, indeterminate “other duty,” the DoD has
developed guidance for National Guard units deployed on civil disturbance
or civil support missions.108 As the PCA does not apply to the National
Guard in Title 32 status, the National Guard could partake in law
enforcement activities in any city or state.109 The PCA was created to
prohibit the military from engaging in law enforcement, yet, as the National

102. NAT’L GUARD BUREAU, CNGBI 1302.01, GUIDANCE FOR MEMBERS PERFORMING
DUTY UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF 32 USC § 502(F) para. 1 (2012) [hereinafter CNGBI
1302.01],
https://www.ngbpmc.ng.mil/Portals/27/
Publications/cngbi/CNGBI%201302.01%2020170712.pdf?ver=2018-05-09-165343-363
[https://perma.cc/F6PS-K5D7] (certified as current in July 2017) (“This policy governs the
use of National Guard (NG) members performing duty under the authority of Title 32
United States Code (U.S.C.) § 502(f) for missions other than missions authorized by 32
U.S.C. § 112 ‘Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities,’ 32 U.S.C. § 902 ‘Homeland
Defense Activities,’ 32 U.S.C. § 328 ‘Active Guard and Reserve duty: Governor’s
Authority,’ and 10 U.S.C. § 12310(c) ‘Operations Relating to Defense Against Weapons of
Mass Destruction and Terrorist Attacks.’”).
103. The National Guard Bureau is “a joint activity of the Department of
Defense . . . [and] the channel of communications on all matters pertaining to the National
Guard, the Army National Guard of the United States, and the Air National Guard of the
United States between (1) the Department of the Army and Department of the Air Force,
and (2) the several States.” 10 U.S.C. § 10501.
104. See supra note 102.
105. DODI 3025.20, supra note 25, para. 4(a).
106. Id. at Enclosure 3 para. 2b.
107. Id. at Enclosure 3 para. 2b(7).
108. See DODI 3025.22, supra note 75, para. 2(a)(2) (“The use of the National Guard for
[Defense Support of Civil Authorities] in response to a request for assistance from a federal
department or agency or qualifying entity in accordance with Reference (e), when
conducted in a duty status pursuant to section 502(f) of Reference (a).”).
109. See supra note 71.
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Guard in Title 32 status is considered a state force, such units are not
subject to this limitation.110 Pursuant to this DoD guidance, the National
Guard serves in a support capacity to local civil authorities111 and is
typically tasked with assignments like crowd management, transportation
security, or emergency responder protection.112 Although not explicitly
stated, the NGB indicates that National Guard members may be able to
make arrests depending on the degree of force used by those evading the
law.113 When working pursuant to another state’s request for assistance,
National Guard members are not authorized to make arrests unless the
governor of the affected state permits National Guard units to do so.114 The
NGB does not promulgate specific advice in making arrests or conducting
similar law enforcement activities when acting pursuant to a federal
mission. While deployed to the capital, the out-of-state guard units have
been primarily deployed to support local law enforcement.115 During its
June 2020 deployment, these National Guard units were unarmed,116 yet
guard units were fully armed for the January 2021 presidential
inauguration.117
II. THE EXECUTIVE’S BROAD INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 502(F)
WILL PREVAIL OVER AN AMBIGUOUS STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
There is no indication that the executive’s all-embracing utilization of
the National Guard will subside.118 As the National Guard’s role in

110. See supra note 71.
111. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3025.18, DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES
(DSCA)
para.
2
(2010),
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/302518p.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N9RE-8XRM] (updated Mar. 2018).
112. DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 65, at 105–06 (finding that the
National Guard could provide area security support, facility security operations, and manage
public safety and security support assets).
113. NGR 500-5, supra note 33, para. 4-4. In Level Four, suspects that use violence or
threatening behavior, National Guard agents could use chemical agents to affect an arrest.
Id. para. 4-4(g)(4).
114. Id. para. 8-6.
115. See, e.g., Press Release, Off. of Utah Gov. Gary R. Herbert, The Utah National
Guard in Washington D.C. (June 5, 2020), https://justfacts.votesmart.org/publicstatement/1434466/the-utah-national-guard-in-washington-dc
[https://perma.cc/BRF6USV6] (“[T]he Utah National Guard is in the area to play a support role for local law
enforcement, helping with cleanup duties and protecting various national treasures.”).
116. See Sonne et al., supra note 15.
117. See Helene Cooper & Adam Goldman, Pentagon to Arm National Guard Troops
Deploying to Capitol for Inauguration, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/us/politics/national-guard-troops-armedinauguration.html [https://perma.cc/DC2W-AQ9V].
118. See supra note 63.
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domestic affairs grows, determining the limitation on the executive’s use of
Title 32 National Guard units becomes increasingly important because
providing the executive indeterminate discretion to use such troops may
“open[] the door to potential abuse.”119 This potential for misuse leaves
major cities vulnerable to deployments of the National Guard in opposition
to local authorities. In Section II.A, this Note argues that, utilizing the
principles of statutory interpretation, the executive’s broad interpretation of
Section 502(f) will prevail given the statute’s ambiguity. Although a
textual reading of Section 502(f) provides that the executive is limited in
regulating National Guard units, the legislative history demonstrates an
intent to delegate broad authority to the executive. In Section II.B, this
Note explains that, given the statute’s ambiguity, a legal challenge to the
executive’s interpretation will fail as the Supreme Court practices extreme
deference to the executive on matters of military and national security.
A. Principles of Statutory Interpretations Support a Limited
Interpretation of Section 502(f)
The Supreme Court has employed a process of practical reasoning in
statutory interpretation, relying on a hierarchy of sources to interpret
statutes.120 Although judges differ in their approaches to statutory
interpretation, this analysis often begins with examining the statutory
text.121 The Court will assume Congress granted undefined statutory words
their “ordinary meaning.”122 Ordinary Meaning refers to the assumption
“that Congress uses common words in their popular meaning, as used in the
common speech of men.”123 If a term is defined by the statute, the Court
follows the provided definition even if contrary to the ordinary meaning.124
A court’s investigation does not end with a presumption of ordinary
meaning as statutory interpretation is “holistic” and must be consistent

119. See Jackie Gardina, Toward Military Rule? A Critique of Executive Discretion to
Use the Military in Domestic Emergencies, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 1027, 1079 (2008).
120. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation
as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 353–54 (1990).
121. Id. at 354–59; see also NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 942 (2017) (“The
text is clear, so we need not consider this extra-textual evidence.”).
122. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015); Schindler Elevator Corp. v.
United States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401, 407 (2011).
123. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV.
527, 536 (1947).
124. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000) (“When a statute includes an
explicit definition, we must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary
meaning.”).
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within the statutory context.125 In doing so, the Court can employ a
number of textual canons of statutory construction, including maxims of
word association, which are general notions of English language
composition or syntax.126 Additionally, statutory provisions are read by
reference to the whole act127 and similar provisions elsewhere in the law.128
Courts also avoid interpreting provisions that would yield inconsistent
meaning when referencing other statutes that rely on a particular
interpretation.129 For example, in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., the Supreme Court considered other statutory provisions to
determine if the FDA was authorized to regulate tobacco.130
If a court finds a clear textual meaning, this may conclude the statutory
analysis or serve as a presumption that the textual meaning is correct.131 If
the statute is still ambiguous, judges may rely on legislative history to
illuminate the meaning behind the statutory text.132 Legislative history is
always potentially relevant because statutes can be amended over time.133
If Congress’s intent is ascertained by the legislative history and supports
the textual meaning, the interpretation is likely decisive.134 If there is a

125. E.g., SW Gen., 137 S. Ct. at 938–39 (interpreting disputed terms using first the
statutory subsection individually and then considering the statute as a whole); United Sav.
Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (“A provision
that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory
scheme — because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its
meaning clear.”).
126. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 595 (6th ed. 2020).
127. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 319 (2010) (“In sum, ‘[w]e do
not . . . construe statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole.’” (quoting
United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984))).
128. E.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 717
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (considering “the sense in which [the disputed statutory term]
is used elsewhere in federal legislation and treaty”); United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d
1312, 1316 (7th Cir. 1990) (considering how similar statutes were applied in other
circumstances).
129. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143–44 (2000)
(referencing other statutory provisions enacted by Congress to determine whether the FDA
had authority to regulate tobacco).
130. Id. at 143–45 (reviewing six pieces of legislation that Congress passed regarding
tobacco regulation).
131. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 120, at 355–56.
132. See, e.g., Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 572 (2011) (“Those of us who
make use of legislative history believe that clear evidence of congressional intent may
illuminate ambiguous text.”)
133. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 695–96 (2014) (citing
subsequent amendments to the definition of “exercise of religion”); Powerex Corp. v.
Reliant Energy Servs., 551 U.S. 224, 231 (2007) (reviewing the amendment of a statute over
time to show statutory meaning).
134. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 120, at 357.

2021]

THE NATIONAL GUARD IN TITLE 32 STATUS

1307

lack of clarity after consulting legislative history, the Court may refer to
more dynamic factors such as constitutional principles,135 agency
enforcement methods,136 and legislative inaction.137
Applying this framework to Section 502(f) in Section A.i, the textual
interpretation reveals a more limited interpretation of Section 502(f) yet
does not clarify the extent to which the DoD is limited in regulating the
National Guard. As the textual interpretation is still ambiguous, Section
A.ii reviews Section 502(f)’s legislative history finding it does not provide
insight into any limitations on the DoD using 502(f) authorized National
Guard troops. Therefore, given that the text and legislative history are
imprecise, referring to other interpretative devices like legislative inaction
indicates the executive’s broad interpretation of Section 502(f) will prevail.
i. What is “Other Duty”?
To understand what “other duty” entails, statutory interpretation must
begin with the text.138 In doing so, a textual analysis of Section 502(f)
demonstrates three findings. First, while a strict reading of Section 502(f)
provides the DoD has broad discretion to use Title 32 National Guard
members, referencing the entirety of Section 502 and other statutory
provisions limits the extent of DoD’s authority. Second, Section 502(f)(2)
specifically allows the President or Secretary of Defense to request the
National Guard in Title 32 status capacity, yet this is limited by the
provision’s plain meaning. Third, Section 502(f)’s “other duty” will likely
be limited under the canon of constitutional avoidance because the
Constitution provides Congress the power to call forth the National Guard.
Although the text indicates a limitation on the DoD, there is still ambiguity
behind this “other duty” language and, therefore, the legislative history
should be consulted.
A textual reading of only Section 502(f) indicates that the DoD has
broad authority to use the National Guard in Title 32 status. Under Section
502(f)(1), the National Guard may “be ordered to perform training or other
duty in addition to that prescribed under [Section 502(a)]” pursuant to
135. Id. at 359; Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L.
REV. 825, 834 (2017) (explaining that the canon of constitutional avoidance “holds that if
there are two or more plausible readings of a statute, and one of these raises serious
constitutional concerns, the Court should adopt the reading that avoids the constitutional
problem”).
136. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 126, at 811–12.
137. Id. (discussing legislative inaction); see also Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255,
269 (1992) (assuming Congress acquiesced to long standing interpretation of statute by
lower courts).
138. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296–97
(2006); see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 120, at 353–54.
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regulations created by the Secretary of the Army or Secretary of the Air
Force.139 The use of “or” in a statute without a list of items is disjunctive
as this is the ordinary use of the word “or.”140 Duty, therefore, must differ
from training based on the statute’s plain meaning. This interpretation is
supported by reading Section 502(f)(2)(A), which explains that training or
duty under Section 502(f)(1) may include “[s]upport of operations or
missions undertaken by the member’s unit at the request of the President or
Secretary of Defense.”141
The term “may” connotes discretion.142
Therefore, as Section 502(f)(2) uses the term “may” to expand upon
training or duty under Section 502(f)(1), this indicates that training or other
duty is not limited to the examples outlined in Section 502(f)(2). If “other
duty” could include the National Guard supporting any mission or
operation, then the DoD’s Section 502(f) authority over the National Guard
is expansive.
Although referring to Section 502(f) does not restrict the DoD in
ordering the National Guard to conduct “other duty,” referencing the entire
act and other statutory provisions indicates a more limited meaning behind
Section 502(f). In statutory interpretation, the entire act, including other
Section 502 provisions and additional statutes, must be referenced as
statutory interpretation is “holistic.”143 As the National Guard has been
authorized to conduct homeland security operations under 32 U.S.C. § 904
and counter-drug activities under 32 U.S.C. § 112, defining “other duty” as
any duty would make any additional statutes that cite Section 502(f)
repetitive. If “other duty” meant any duty, the DoD could authorize the
National Guard to conduct homeland security missions or counter-drug
operations without additional statutory authorization. “Other duty”
therefore cannot be limitless to supporting any and all operations or
missions.
Yet, although “other duty” is not limited by Section 502(f)(2), the
President’s authority to request the National Guard pursuant to Section

139. 32 U.S.C. § 502(f)(1).
140. Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 357 (2014); United States v. Woods, 571
U.S. 31, 45 (2013) (“While that can sometimes introduce an appositive — a word or phrase
that is synonymous with what precedes it (‘Vienna or Wien,’ ‘Batman or the Caped
Crusader’) — its ordinary use is almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are
to ‘be given separate meanings.’” (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339
(1979))).
141. 32 U.S.C. § 502(f)(2)(A).
142. See, e.g., Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1977 (2016)
(“Unlike the word ‘may,’ which implies discretion, the word ‘shall’ usually connotes a
requirement.”).
143. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 695–96 (2014); Samantar v.
Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 319 (2010); Ricci v. DeStefano 557 U.S. 557, 580 (2009).
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502(f) is restricted given the language used in Section 502(f)(2)(A) and the
other statutory provision citing Section 502(f). Compared to Section
502(f)(1), which holds that the National Guard could be “ordered to
perform training or other duty,” Section 502(f)(2)(A) uses more limited
language stating that the President could request the National Guard to
“[s]upport of operations or missions.”144 The Court has found that a
variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning.145 Therefore, using
“support” rather than “perform” indicates a restraint in the National Guard
performing operations or missions. In addition, other statutory provisions
that authorize the National Guard to conduct duties pursuant to Section
502(f) use the term “perform” or “execute.”146 Referring to the ordinary
meaning of support and perform,147 support has a more limited dictionary
definition.148 Support has been defined as “to promote the interests or
cause of” or “assist, help,”149 whereas “perform” can mean “to adhere to
the terms of” or “carry out, do.”150 Asserting these dictionary definitions, it
is likely that the President and Secretary of Defense are limited in
requesting the National Guard to “assist” or “help” rather than to “perform”

144. 32 U.S.C. §§ 502(f)(1)–(2) (emphases added).
145. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[Where] Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720,
722 (5th Cir. 1972))).
146. See 32 U.S.C. § 904(a) (stating the National Guard “may support or execute
homeland defense activities”); 32 U.S.C. § 112(b) (stating the National Guard may “be
ordered to perform full-time National Guard duty under section 502(f)”).
147. See Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401, 407
(2011); Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015).
148. Dictionaries can help find the ordinary meaning of a term. See Taniguchi v. Kan
Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566–67 (2012) (using many dictionaries including
Webster’s Dictionary); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 732–33 (2006) (plurality
opinion) (using Webster’s dictionary).
149. Support,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/support?src=search-dict-hed [https://perma.cc/ZEM3-HDCQ] (last
visited Sept. 3, 2021). Oxford Dictionary is generally consistent with this definition of
“support” defining the word in its second definition as “[g]ive assistance to, especially
financially; enable to function or act.” While the first definition is “[b]ear all or part of the
weight of; hold up,” this definition does not seem as applicable given it is defined in
reference
to
“supporting
objects.”
See
Support,
LEXICO,
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/support [https://perma.cc/2WTR-BZZW] (last visited
Sept. 3, 2021) (Lexico is an Oxford University powered dictionary).
150. Perform,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY,
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/perform [https://perma.cc/UV2Q-3PDG] (last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
Oxford Dictionary is even more supportive of the Merriam-Webster definition of perform,
defining “perform” as “[c]arry out, accomplish, or fulfill (an action, task, or function).” See
Perform, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/perform [https://perma.cc./UE53KD9P] (last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
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or “carry out” operations or missions. This would be consistent with
National Guard supporting local law enforcement in the capital pursuant to
President Trump’s request.
This limited reading of Section 502(f) is supported by the canon of
constitutional avoidance because the Constitution permits only Congress to
call forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress
insurrections, and repel invasion.151 The canon of constitutional avoidance
provides that if a reading of a statute indicates serious doubt on the statute’s
constitutionality, a court should find another plausible reading that would
avoid the constitutional issue.152 If the DoD were permitted to call upon
the National Guard to enforce federal laws, Congress would have to
provide explicit authorization to the DoD to do so. Although Congress has
authorized the President to federalize the National Guard under the
Insurrection Act,153 Congress would have to clearly delegate such authority
to the executive under Title 32.154

A textual interpretation of Section 502(f) demonstrates a limited
interpretation of “other duty,” yet there is a lack of clarity over what
this “other duty” could entail. As the statute’s textual reading does
not indicate a clear understanding of “other duty,” referring to the
legislative history is a proper recourse to discover the meaning of
“other duty.”
ii. Congress Provided Broad Authority to the Executive
If the statutory meaning is still ambiguous, judges may rely on
legislative history to illuminate the meaning behind the statutory text.155 If
there is a lack of clarity after consulting legislative history, the Court may
refer to more dynamic factors such as constitutional principles,156 agency
enforcement methods,157 and legislative inaction.158 The legislative history

151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
152. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988).
153. 10 U.S.C. §§ 251–255.
154. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575.
155. See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1749 (2020) (“Legislative
history, for those who take it into account, is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”
(quoting Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 574 (2011))); see also Milner, 562 U.S.
at 572 (“Those of us who make use of legislative history believe that clear evidence of
congressional intent may illuminate ambiguous text.”).
156. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 120, at 359; Krishnakumar, supra note 135, at
834–35.
157. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 126, at 811–12.
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reveals two findings. First, although the legislative history provides insight
into the purpose of Section 502(f), there is no indication that Congress
sought to limit the executive’s use of Title 32 National Guard units.
Second, the legislative history suggests that the President and Secretary of
Defense’s authority to request the National Guard under Title 32 is limited
to supporting ongoing missions rather than executing any mission.
Therefore, as the legislative history does not provide a limitation on the
DoD’s authority, the courts may assume that Congress has acquiesced to
DoD regulations that show a broad interpretation of Section 502(f) since no
statutory amendments have been enacted to limit the executive.
The legislative history of Section 502 indicates a shift in the National
Guard’s role that supports a broad interpretation of Section 502(f).
Legislative history is always potentially relevant because statutes can be
amended over time.159 While originally enacted to ensure the DoD had the
authority to authorize training for the National Guard,160 the congressional
record indicates that the 2007 amendments to Section 502(f) represented a
transition for Title 32 National Guard units from a “strategic reserve” to an
“operational reserve.”161 In explaining this shift in the congressional
record, then-Senator Levin defined an “operational reserve” as “actively
support[ing] ongoing operational missions where appropriate.”162 Because
the Senator’s explanation was provided through the congressional record,
such records can provide insight into the legislative intent of Section
502(f).163 Senator Levin’s remarks, therefore, support an interpretation that
the intent of Section 502 was to transition the National Guard into an
operational force under the discretion of the DoD.

158. See id. (discussing legislative inaction); see Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255,
269 (1992) (assuming Congress acquiesced to long standing interpretation of statute by
lower courts).
159. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 695–96 (2014) (citing
subsequent amendments to detect Congress’s changing definition of “exercise of religion”);
Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., 551 U.S. 224, 231 (2007) (reviewing the
amendment of a statute over time to show statutory meaning).
160. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-886, at 1 (1963); SEN. REP. NO. 88-1584, at 1 (1963); H.R.
REP. NO. 87-788, at 1 (1961).
161. 152 CONG. REC. S6,392 (daily ed. June 22, 2006) (statement of Sen. Levin).
162. Id.
163. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 176 (2007) (citing findings in the
congressional record to support an interpretation of a statute); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
593, 642 (2010) (referencing the congressional record); see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl,
Statutory Interpretation and the Rest of the Iceberg: Divergences Between the Lower
Federal Courts and the Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. 1, 31, 50 tbl. 2 (2018) (showing
congressional records were cited when interpreting statutes by both the Supreme Court and
lower courts).
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Although the legislative history does not explicitly provide limitations
on the DoD to use the National Guard pursuant to Section 502(f), the
congressional record suggests the President and Secretary of Defense’s
authority under Section 502(f)(2)(A) is limited. Following Senator Levin’s
explanation, Senator Kent Conrad provided an example of operational
reserve service in which the North Dakota Air National Guard could
provide security to augment Active-Duty security forces if the Secretary of
Defense so requested it.164 A House Committee report also supports a
limitation on the President’s authority to request the National Guard. The
committee explicitly stated that the new amendments will authorize “[s]tate
governors . . . to mobilize national guard forces to support operational
missions taken at the request of the President or the Secretary of
Defense.”165 The committee report did not state that a governor could
authorize the performance of missions but only to support missions. As
committee reports are the most authoritative piece of legislative history166
but do not supersede the plain meaning of the statute,167 the President’s
authority to request Title 32 National Guard troops may be restricted to
supporting ongoing missions.
As both the textual analysis and legislative history do not explicitly
provide limitations on the executive’s ability to use the National Guard
under Section 502(f), courts may employ an assumption of legislative
acquiescence. If Congress is aware of an agency interpretation of a statute
and does not amend the statute, the Court may presume that Congress
“acquiesced” to this interpretation.168 This assumption would allow the
executive’s broad interpretation to prevail. Congress was aware of the
executive’s extensive use of Section 502(f) as the most recent appropriation
bill featured a proposed amendment to restrict Section 502(f).169 Yet, this
amendment was removed prior to passage.170 Although the Supreme Court

164. See 152 CONG. REC. S6,392–93 (statement of Sen. Conrad).
165. H.R. REP. NO. 109-452, at 311 (2007).
166. Dig. Realty Tr., Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 782 (2018) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“Committee reports, like the Senate Report the Court discusses here . . . are a
particularly reliable source to which we can look to ensure our fidelity to Congress’
intended meaning.” (internal citations omitted)); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1010
n.9 (1994).
167. Compare Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 304
(2006) (finding legislative history is not needed “in the face of unambiguous text”), with id.
at 308–13 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“I can find no good reason for this Court to interpret the
language of this statute as meaning the precise opposite of what Congress told us it
intended.”).
168. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 126, at 811–12.
169. William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021, H.R. 6395, 116th Cong. § 513 (2020).
170. See id.
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normally requires more time to pass prior to attributing significance to the
failure of Congress to act on legislation,171 Section 502(f) was last amended
in 2007, and the Court has employed this assumption in shorter time
frames.172
B. Given the Ambiguity behind Section 502(f), the Court will Defer to
the Executive’s Interpretation
Seeing as Section 502(f) does not indicate that the DoD is limited in
regulating Title 32 National Guard forces, the Court may defer to the
executive branch’s interpretation of Section 502(f). In matters of national
security, the Court has employed Curtiss-Wright deference, which provides
extreme deference to the executive’s interpretation of statutory authority in
military and foreign affairs. As Section 502(f) does not expressly limit the
DoD in regulating the National Guard and the executive’s interpretation of
Section 502(f) encompasses matters of national security, the executive’s
broad interpretation of Section 502(f) will prevail.
i. Curtiss-Wright Deference
In cases of national security or foreign affairs, the Supreme Court has
strongly deferred to the executive department’s interpretation of their
powers through what has been called Curtiss-Wright deference, named
after the 1936 Court decision.173 In United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Exports, the Court held that “congressional legislation . . . within the
international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion
and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were
domestic affairs alone involved.”174 When applying Curtiss-Wright
deference, the Court will find the executive department’s interpretation
prevails in cases of both statutory ambiguity and where Congress has not
preempted the agency or presidential interpretation.175 “Thus, unless
Congress specifically has provided otherwise, courts traditionally have
been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and

171. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600 (1983) (finding the
nonaction of Congress significant after 12 years from first passing the statute, yet, during
this time, 13 bills were introduced to overturn the IRS interpretation of a statute).
172. See id. at 600–01.
173. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1100 (2008).
174. 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
175. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 173, at 1100–01.
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national security affairs.”176 This high level of deference is attributed to
the Court’s reliance on the President’s Article II powers rather than just on
Congress’s Article I authority and, therefore, not dependent upon statutory
delegation.177 Although statutory delegation is not a central consideration
in using this standard, such authorization would augment the executive’s
interpretation.178
Tracking the Court’s deference regime, William Eskridge and Lauren
Baer found that the Court employed Curtiss-Wright deference in cases
involving foreign affairs and national security without explicitly
mentioning this standard of deference.179 Although the Court may
generally employ strong deference to the President’s interpretation in
foreign affairs and national security, the Court does not always exercise
this deference. This occurred in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.180 In Hamdan, the
majority opinion did not defer to the President’s statutory interpretation
given the Court’s dissimilar interpretation of the statute and the executive’s
failure to provide convincing evidence for his interpretation.181
ii. Deference to the Executive’s Interpretation on Section 502(f)
As the Court tends to use Curtiss-Wright deference on matters of
national security, the Court is likely to uphold the executive interpretation
of Section 502(f). The executive’s broad interpretation is likely to receive
Curtiss-Wright deference considering that Congress did not expressly limit
the executive in Section 502(f), and the executive has cited Section 502(f)

176. Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988); see also Munaf v. Geren, 553
U.S. 674, 689 (2008).
177. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 173, at 1100–01; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981) (“Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with regard to every
possible action the President may find it necessary to take or every possible situation in
which he might act.”).
178. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 173, at 1100–01; see also Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–37 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (finding the
President’s authority is at its maximum “[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization of Congress . . . for it includes all that he possesses in his own right
plus all that Congress can delegate.”).
179. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 173, at 1102.
180. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
181. Id. at 623–24 (2006) (finding the President’s statutory interpretation warranted less
deference given the Court’s interpretation of the statute and the executive’s failure to
provide convincing evidence for his interpretation). But see id. at 679–81 (2006) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (advocating for “a heavy measure of [judicial] deference” to the President’s
interpretation of statutory grants of authority by relying on an inherent presidential authority
in foreign affairs and national security stemming from the Court’s opinion in Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981)).
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to authorize the National Guard to conduct military and national security
operations.182
While the Supreme Court has not always employed Curtiss-Wright
deference when the statutory text provides clear limitations on the
executive, Section 502(f), as discussed, does not unequivocally restrict the
executive. As the statutory language and legislative history may indicate
the executive was vested with broad authority, the Court is likely to defer
to the executive’s interpretation.183 Although a textual reading of Section
502(f) may limit the executive’s ability to regulate Title 32 National Guard
units to only missions statutorily authorized,184 the Court may accept the
executive’s interpretation given there are no explicit statutory limitations.
Therefore, given the failure of Congress to unambiguously restrict the DoD
in Section 502(f), the Court will likely defer to the executive’s broad
interpretation.
Since the executive has used Section 502(f) to authorize the National
Guard in military and national security operations, the Court will likely be
reluctant to reject this interpretation. The Court utilizes Curtiss-Wright
deference for executive interpretations of statutes that grant authority to the
executive in military and national security affairs. The executive’s
interpretation of Section 502(f) deals exclusively in military and national
security manners. For example, in conducting support to local authorities,
the National Guard can provide “military support” during “national security
emergencies” pursuant to Section 502(f).185 A national security emergency
may include responding to any natural disaster, military attack, or other

182. See supra Sections I.B.ii–iii.
183. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 187 (1993) (“It is perfectly clear
that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) . . . grants the President ample power to establish a naval blockade
that would simply deny illegal Haitian migrants the ability to disembark on our shores.”);
Carlucci v. Doe, 488 U.S. 93, 104 (1988) (finding the statute uses permissive language to
authorize the executive to remove one’s security clearances); see also CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S.
159, 168–69 (1985) (“The plain meaning of the statutory language, as well as the legislative
history of the National Security Act, however, indicates that Congress vested in the Director
of Central Intelligence very broad authority to protect all sources of intelligence information
from disclosure.”).
184. See supra Section II.A.i.
185. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3025.12, MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR CIVIL
DISTURBANCES (MACDIS) para. 4.1.7.2. (1994), https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=386
(“Under the national civil defense policy, the Department of Defense shall support civil
authorities in civil defense, to include facilitating the use of the National Guard in each State
for response in both peacetime disasters and national security emergencies.” (emphasis
added)); Id. para. 1.5 (“Facilitate the coordination of [military assistance] . . . to Civil
Authorities . . . .); Id. para. E2.1.16 (“Military Support to Civil Authorities . . . [includes
measures] to foster mutual assistance and support between the [DoD] and any civil
government agency . . . including national security emergencies.”).
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emergencies that “threatens the national security of the United States.”186
Considering that the executive cites Section 502(f) to use the National
Guard to support military and national security operations, the executive’s
interpretation will likely prevail under the Court’s Curtiss-Wright
deference.
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH THE EXECUTIVE’S INTERPRETATION OF
SECTION 502(F)
As the executive’s broad interpretation of Section 502(f) is likely to
survive under the Court’s Curtiss-Wright deference regime, the executive
can use the National Guard for a wide breadth of operations or missions.
Part III argues that permitting the executive to utilize the National Guard
pursuant to this extensive interpretation presents two key policy problems.
First, in Section III.A, this Note explains that the executive is not statutorily
required to obtain local approval prior to deploying out-of-state National
Guard units into a municipality. In doing so, the executive can subject
local cities, especially Washington D.C., to unwanted deployments of
National Guard units. Second, in Section III.B, this Note argues that,
although a governor can deny the executive’s request to use National Guard
units in Title 32 status, a state governor is unlikely to reject such a request.
A. Executive’s Control over the Title 32 Units Becomes a City’s Crisis,
Especially Washington D.C.
Pursuant to a broad interpretation of Section 502(f), the executive is not
prohibited from authorizing a mission that deploys National Guard units
from one state into the cities of a different state. In doing so, the executive
is not required to receive the permission of local authorities. Such
deployments of National Guard units are detrimental to localities because
the National Guard may be immune from state and local law. The recent
deployments to Washington D.C. demonstrate how the capital is
particularly suspectable to possible misuse of the National Guard.
Title 32 does not have any language prohibiting the President from
authorizing National Guard units to missions in cities within other states.
A recently proposed amendment in the Defense Authorization Act of 2021
demonstrates the absence of such a prohibitive provision.187 This reform
would limit Section 502(f)(2)(A) to only domestic missions and require the

186. Id. para. E2.1.17.
187. William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021, H.R. 6395, 116th Cong. § 513.
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consent of local authorities where these operations take place.188 The
amendment was removed from this bill,189 and neither Title 32 nor Section
502 currently have such a restriction. The President, therefore, can
seemingly authorize otherwise unwanted National Guard troops to missions
in any locality. Although subsequent unpassed legislative history is not
determinative to the meaning of a statute,190 this amendment is relevant in
demonstrating that the current statutory structure does not explicitly
prohibit the President from sending out-of-state National Guard units into a
city without local consent.191
Given the lack of legal clarity around Title 32 status deployment, out-ofstate units may be immune from state and municipal law to the detriment of
local citizens. The National Guard used pursuant to the executive’s request
may avoid legal liability for actions in another state as state or federal law
may immunize Title 32 guard members.192 Some states provide immunity
to guard members in Title 32 status.193 If operating in such a state, out-ofstate Title 32 units may violate local law under the cover of such immunity.
Depending on the scope of the mission and governance of federal
regulations, the Federal Supremacy Clause may also grant the Title 32 units
immunity from state law.194 The Federal Supremacy Clause establishes
that federal law takes precedence over state law and state constitutions.195

188. Therefore, 32 U.S.C. § 502(f)(2) would read as follows: “(2) The training or duty
ordered to be performed under paragraph (1) may include the following: (A) Support of
operations or missions undertaken by the member’s unit at the request of the President or
Secretary of Defense ‘and performed inside the United States with the consent of the chief
executive officer of the State.’”
189. William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021, Pub. L. No. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388 (2021).
190. See, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Emps. Ins., 508 U.S. 286, 293 (1993) (finding
subsequent congressional legislation helpful in determining the meaning of a statute). But
see Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 632 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“In my
opinion, the views of a legislator concerning a statute already enacted are entitled to no
more weight than the views of a judge concerning a statute not yet passed.”).
191. Although clarification by Congress can mean a disagreement with the executive’s
statutory interpretation rather than an assumption that the executive’s interpretation is
correct, this amendment demonstrates the President is not explicitly restricted by statute.
192. Compare DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 65, at 238 (“When
the National Guard operates in a State status, either Title 32 or SAD, the rules for the use of
force are based on the State law where the mission is taking place.”), with NGR 500-5,
supra note 33, para. 4-4 (“Before deployment, states involved will normally negotiate an
agreement on which rules for the use of force the supporting units and forces will follow.”
(emphasis added)).
193. See, e.g., N.Y. MIL. LAW § 235 (McKinney 2021) (granting civil and criminal
immunity to New York National Guard in active service for the state for “any act or acts
done by them in the performance of their duty”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 412.154(1) (2021).
194. DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 65, at 237.
195. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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Current case law suggests that the Federal Supremacy Clause could provide
immunity to non-federal personnel executing federally-authorized missions
like the Title 32 National Guard units, which are technically state
entities.196 In addition, guard members in Title 32 status are also immune
from common law torts,197 as National Guard members acting under
Section 502 are covered by the Federal Torts Claims Act.198 Therefore, if a
National Guard member were to injure a local resident during such a
deployment, the member may be immune from such wrongdoing under
either state or federal law.
Based on the President’s ability to authorize out-of-state missions, the
residents of Washington D.C. are particularly vulnerable to potential
misuse of the National Guard. Unlike other units which are under the
control of their governor, the DCNG is under the direct authority of the
President.199 In conjunction with the President’s ability to request Title 32
units for missions, the executive has unilateral control over National Guard
units in the capital.200 The executive can, therefore, selectively utilize these

196. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Laing, 133 F. 887 (4th Cir. 1904) (member of U.S.
Marshal’s posse made of ordinary citizens charged with murder); Connecticut v. Marra, 528
F. Supp. 381 (D. Conn. 1981) (FBI informant charged with attempting to bribe a city
policeman).
197. See Gilmore v. Mississippi, 905 F.3d 781, 784–85 (5th Cir. 2018) (“Although
National Guard members do not normally fall within the definition of ‘federal employees,’
they are covered by the Westfall Act when ‘engaged in . . . duty under section . . . 502 . . . of
title 32.’ 28 U.S.C. § 2671.’”); Jackson v. Tate, 648 F.3d 729, 735–36 (9th Cir. 2011)
(finding National Guard members are exempt from common law torts under the Westfall
Act when operating under section 502(f)).
198. 28 U.S.C. § 2671.
199. D.C. Code § 49-409 (2020) (“The President of the United States shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of the militia of the District of Columbia.”).
200. Letter from Mark A. Milley, Gen., U.S. Army, & Mark T. Esper, Sec’y of Def., to
Adam
Smith,
Rep.,
U.S.
House
of
Reps.
(June
10,
2020),
https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jul/06/2002434495/-1/-1/1/4-10-JUN-2020-RESPONSEOSD005360-20-REPLY-061720-CJCS-AND-SD.PDF
[https://perma.cc/UK6J-DSCK].
Although the letter states the National Guard was under the tactical control of the DCNG’s
Major General, the Major General reports to the President. D.C. NAT’L GUARD, 2019
ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2019) [hereinafter DCNG, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT],
https://dc.ng.mil/Portals/26/2019%20DCNG%20Annual%20Report_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DH2R-U75Q] (showing an organization chart of the DCNG illustrating the
Major General reports to the President). Tactical control also allows the federal government
to give orders “necessary to accomplish missions or tasked assigned.” DEPT. OF DEF., DOD
DICTIONARY
OF
MILITARY
AND
ASSOCIATED
TERMS
209
(2021),
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WFU6-SSCU]; see also Elizabeth Goitein & Joseph Nunn, Why DC’s
Mayor Should Have Authority over the DC National Guard, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan.
8, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/why-dcs-mayor-shouldhave-authority-over-dc-national-guard [https://perma.cc/VL4N-HW7Y] (“[T]he Department
of Justice has ADOPTED the legal fiction that the DCNG may operate in non-federal status
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both out-of-state Title 32 units and the DCNG to conduct law enforcement
activities as they are not subject to the PCA. The two recent incidences of
out-of-state guard deployments in D.C. demonstrate the extent to which the
capital is subject to the executive’s whim. During the June 2020
deployment, Mayor Bowser’s opposition was disregarded by both the
Trump Administration and state governors.201 The executive then rejected
the governors’ of Virginia and Maryland and the D.C. Mayor’s request to
send guard units during the January 2021 invasion of the Capitol, resulting
in several injuries and deaths.202 Based on the previously discussed legal
ambiguity of Title 32 troops’ deployment and the executive’s broad power
derived from Section 502(f), the capital is defenseless against the
executive’s complete power over the National Guard while deployed in the
capital.
B. Governor’s Consent is an Ineffective Check on the Executive’s
Section 502(f) Authority
Although unrestricted in deploying out-of-state National Guard units
into other cities, the executive must still acquire permission from a
governor prior to deploying a state’s National Guard in Title 32 status.
While in Title 32 status, the National Guard is still under the direct
authority of the governor. Therefore, the governor could either reject a

even though it is always under the president’s command and control and is always federally
funded.” (emphasis in original)).
201. See Lara Seligman, Esper Orders All Remaining Active-Duty Troops Home from
D.C.
Area,
POLITICO
(June
5,
2020,
4:29
PM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/05/esper-active-duty-washington-dc-protest303824 [https://perma.cc/W94W-M6GX] (indicating that, when former Secretary Esper
ordered troops to return on June 5, he did not cite the Mayor’s request to remove the troops
as a reason for ending the operation); Camryn Justice, D.C. Mayor Sends Letter to Gov.
DeWine Requesting Ohio National Guard Be Removed from City, ABC NEWS 5 (June 5,
2020, 11:25 PM), https://www.news5cleveland.com/news/state/dc-mayor-sends-letter-togov-dewine-requesting-ohio-national-guard-be-removed-from-city [https://perma.cc/9GH68QZ3] (finding that, although Mayor Bowser requested Ohio Governor Mike DeWine to
remove the Ohio National Guard units in D.C., the Ohio Governor only removed one troop
because the FBI discovered this troop endorsed white supremacy); CBS3 Staff, Gov.
Murphy Says New Jersey’s National Guard Troops Returning from Washington, CBS
PHILLY (June 5, 2020, 2:36 PM), https://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2020/06/05/new-jerseynational-guard-troops-returning-washington-george-floyd-protest/ [https://perma.cc/EP7938E4] (finding New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy stated that New Jersey National Guard
units returned because their deployment ended, not based on the Mayor’s request).
202. Joe Walsh, Reports: Trump Resisted Sending National Guard to Quell Violent Mob
at
U.S.
Capitol,
FORBES
(Jan.
6,
2021,
9:51
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/joewalsh/2021/01/06/reports-trump-resisted-sending-nationalguard-to-quell-violent-mob-at-us-capitol/?sh=199b32431e18
[https://perma.cc/SEG4TYWN]; see also Read & Hennessy-Fiske, supra note 6 (reporting many injuries and five
fatalities as a result of the Capitol invasion).

1320

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

request from the executive or, once accepting such a request, order their
National Guard troops to withdraw from any federal operation. Although
the governor can thwart any Title 32 request from the executive, a governor
is unlikely to deny a request to deploy their state’s National Guard in Title
32 status given financial and procedural considerations. Since a governor
is incentivized to approve such a request, the President, therefore, can
easily procure National Guard troops to perform an operational mission.203
As the federal government fully funds the National Guard while in Title
32 status,204 the governor will likely approve such a Title 32 request to
avoid using the state’s budget. The frequency of governors’ acceptance of
federal funds is evident from the large role federal funding plays in each
state National Guard’s budget. Each year, the Comptroller of the Army
National Guard distributes funding to states based on an annual DoD
appropriations bill.205 In Fiscal Year 2020, the federal government was
estimated to provide around $7 billion to the states for the National
Guard.206 In comparison to federal funding, state allocation is minimal.207

203. In addition, there may be incentive for the National Guard units themselves to act
under Title 32 status as such troops would be authorized to use equipment provided by the
federal government. For example, in a recent investigation by the Inspector General
Department of the Air Force regarding four National Guard unit’s use of RC-26Bs aircrafts
while in SAD status, the report found that units in California, Wisconsin, and Arizona
improperly used these aircraft because the primary purpose of their investigation was to
support law enforcement rather than using the aircraft for training as an incidental benefit to
civil law enforcement. INSPECTOR GEN. DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(CASE S8934P) CONCERNING RC-26B OPERATIONS 1–4 JUNE 2020 (2020),
https://media.defense.gov/2020/Aug/21/2002482179/-1/1/1/REPORT_OF_INVESTIGATION_CONCERNING_RC_26B_OPERATIONS_1_4_JU
NE_2020.PDF [https://perma.cc/S8U3-LHQ5]. The Investigation concluded that that the
use of such aircrafts was inappropriate under SAD status and should have been used while
in Title 32 status. Id. at 57.
204. DOMESTIC OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 65, at 63.
205. See, e.g., ARMY NAT’L GUARD, ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT: FY 2015 13 (2015)
[hereinafter ANG FY 2015 REPORT].
206. OFF. OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF. (COMPTROLLER)/CHIEF FIN. OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF
DEF., OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE OVERVIEW: FISCAL YEAR 2020 BUDGET ESTIMATES 19
(2019),
https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/fy2020_OM_Over
view.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3Q2-QABQ]; see also ANG FY 2015 REPORT, supra note 205,
at 101 (providing a breakdown by state).
207. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., READINESS & ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
INTEGRATION
PROGRAM,
STATE
PROFILE:
MISSISSIPPI
1,
https://www.repi.mil/Portals/44/Documents/State_Fact_Sheets/Mississippi_StateFacts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F2M7-BLUH] (last visited Sept. 3, 2021) (stating that, in FY 2018, federal
funding for the Mississippi National Guard was approximately $622 million while state
funding was $7.9 million); OFF. OF N.H. GOV. CHRISTOPHER T. SUNUNU, GOVERNOR’S
CAPITAL BUDGET: FISCAL YEARS ending June, 30 2020-2021 2 (2019),
https://das.nh.gov/budget/Budget2020-2021/GovernorsCapitalBudget.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7CXM-S5V5] (showing the New Hampshire budget, under Adjutant
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While historically, states paid for roughly 85% of the National Guard
budget, the federal government has increasingly funded the National
Guard.208 For example, in 2020, the state of Utah allocated $6 million to
the Utah National Guard, whereas the federal government provided $345
million.209 The numbers would suggest that governors are not shy about
accepting federal funding for their National Guards.
Governors are further incentivized to accept federal requests for
National Guards units because operations under Title 32 status can satisfy
mandatory training requirements. Although operational support may occur
incidental to training under Section 502(a) status,210 National Guard units
under Section 502(f) may satisfy training requirements incidental to
performing duty pursuant to the federal government’s request.211
Therefore, the National Guard can satisfy training requirements while
conducting a federally-authorized mission. For example, when pursuing
missions that support civil authorities, states can count this participation
towards training requirements.212
The possibility to include such
operations towards training requirements may entice states to accept the
President’s or Secretary of Defense’s request to deploy the National Guard.
Moreover, partisanship may play a role in a governor’s decision to
accept or deny an executive request. During the June 2020 D.C.
deployment, largely Republican governors accepted, while predominately

General or National Guard categories, provided around $3 million while federal funding
was around $25 million for FY 2020–2021).
208. COHEN, supra note 49, at 18–19.
209. UTAH
NAT’L
GUARD,
FY
2020
STATE
BUDGET
REQUEST,
https://le.utah.gov/interim/2019/pdf/00002001.pdf [https://perma.cc/4M7C-B3UJ] (last
visited Sept. 16, 2021).
210. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ISSUANCE 1215.06, UNIFORM RESERVE, TRAINING, AND
RETIREMENT CATEGORIES FOR THE RESERVE COMPONENTS Enclosure 3, para. 4 (2014),
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/121506p.pdf?ver=201903-11-081732-937 [https://perma.cc/SNC4-F7HV].
211. NGB DOMESTIC GUIDANCE, supra note 96, at 70.
212. NAT’L GUARD BUREAU, REGULATION 350-1, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD TRAINING
para. 3-9(j) (2009), https://www.ngbpmc.ng.mil/Portals/27/Publications/ngr/ngr%203501.pdf?ver=2018-09-07-082540-017 [https://perma.cc/HE4P-KKUV] (“(1) DSCA projects
may be performed by entire units in conjunction with unit training when appropriate training
is derived for the entire unit and such training contributes to Federal mission readiness. (2)
DSCA projects may be performed by elements of a unit when the element represents an
organized group (platoon, squad, or section) that normally trains together. The training must
contribute to the skill enhancement of all group members and to the readiness of their unit.
(3) DSCA projects may be performed by individuals when the project has a training benefit
toward the unit’s MTOE/TDA mission; e.g., medical service support. (4) Constructive credit
for participation in the DSCA program, as outlined above, may be granted according to
Table 3-2 of this regulation.”).
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Democratic governors denied, the executive’s request.213 Similarly, in
2019, after the former Republican New Mexico Governor accepted
President Trump’s request to deploy the state’s National Guard to the
border, the succeeding Democrat Governor withdrew, on political grounds,
her state’s National Guard from this federal mission.214 Although in each
instance, some governors denied or revoked the executive’s request to use
the National Guard, the President was still able to accumulate National
Guard units for each operation. In the case of the D.C. deployment, the
President was able to acquire a force of around 4,900 National Guard
troops from 11 states.215 At the southern border, the National Guard
continues to operate in support of the Border Patrol.216
IV. RESTRICTING THE EXECUTIVE’S POWER OVER THE NATIONAL
GUARD IN TITLE 32 STATUS AND THE DCNG
The President has vast control over the military, a power derived from
the Constitution and delegated by Congress.217 In the modern era, the
President has often been hesitant in their use of the military in domestic
disputes, including in their utilization of the National Guard.218 Although

213. See Alan Suderman, How Governors Are Responding to Trump Request to Send
National Guard Troops to D.C., PBS (June 2, 2020, 5:47 PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/how-governors-are-responding-to-trumps-request-tosend-national-guard-troops-to-d-c [https://perma.cc/27JB-CEV3] (“At least three states —
New York, Virginia and Delaware — have so far rejected the request, with at least one
governor citing Trump’s rhetoric about using troops to ‘dominate’ protesters as a reason
why. All of those states are led by Democrats.”).
214. Morgan Lee, New Mexico Governor Pulls National Guard Troops from Border,
Assoc.
Press
(Feb.
5,
2019),
https://apnews.com/article/d00059684a424ab7adf1a43c618c86fd
[https://perma.cc/JT9SNU5A]; see also Bill Chappell, N.M. Governor Pulls National Guard from Border, Citing a
‘Charade’
at
Federal
Level,
NPR
(Feb.
6,
2019,
10:25
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/02/06/691937342/n-m-governor-pulls-national-guard-fromborder-citing-a-charade-at-federal-level [https://perma.cc/LN3X-M4TT].
215. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
216. Border Mission Extended Through 2020, NAT’L GUARD ASS’N U.S. (Sept. 17, 2019),
https://www.ngaus.org/about-ngaus/newsroom/border-mission-extended-through-2020
[https://perma.cc/SZ2V-D674].
217. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. (“The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States,
when called into the actual Service of the United States . . . .”).
218. Although not needing the Pennsylvania governor’s permission pursuant to the
Militia Acts of 1792, President Washington did not wish to call forth the militia without
consulting the Governor. Michael Bahar, The Presidential Intervention Principle: The
Domestic Use of the Military and the Power of the Several States, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J.
537, 573 (2014). In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, President Bush was cautious in
responding to this emergency contemplating the optics surrounding his federalization of
Louisiana’s National Guard when opposed by the Democrat Governor Kathleen Blanco. See
Eric Lipton, Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, Political Issues Snarled Plans for Troop Aid,
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rooted in historical precedent, this general disinclination to use military
forces should not become the standard to limit the executive. Without
proper legal or fiscal repercussions, the executive will continue to abuse
this ambiguous and overly broad power. This is especially salient for the
executive’s use of Title 32 National Guard units that are used without
express limitations according to the executive’s interpretation of Section
502(f). In this Part, this Note reviews the recently proposed reform in
Congress and suggests robust solutions to the possible misuse of Title 32
National Guard units. In particular, this Note argues that Section 502(f)
should be limited and that the D.C. Mayor should be granted authority over
the DCNG, similar to the power state governors have over their guard
units.
In the recent National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021,
Section 502(f) was proposed to be amended as follows:
(2) The training or duty ordered to be performed under paragraph
(1) may include the following: (A) Support of operations or
missions undertaken by the member’s unit at the request of the
President or Secretary of Defense “and performed inside the
United States with the consent of the chief executive officer of the
State.”219
This reform, proposed by New Jersey Representative Sherrill of the 11th
District,220 would prohibit the use of out-of-state National Guard to enter
another state, territory, or the capital without local approval.221 This
amendment was removed from the bill.222 Although this amendment might
have solved the problem of the executive branch deploying out-of-state
National Guards in opposition to local wishes, there is still the issue of the
ambiguous “other duty.” Section 502 has been praised for its ability to
provide the National Guard with a wide swath of duties and a flexible
standard to respond to domestic emergencies.223 In empathizing with the
desire to retain this flexibility, this Note proposes three solutions to restrict

N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
9,
2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/09/us/nationalspecial/political-issues-snarled-plans-fortroop-aid.html [https://perma.cc/5GVJ-DLPG].
219. William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021, H.R. 6395, 116th Cong. § 513 (2020).
220. Rep. Mikie Sherrill (@RepSherrill), TWITTER (July 2, 2020, 7:42 PM),
https://twitter.com/RepSherrill/status/1278836354722541570?s=20
[https://perma.cc/WD8R-9Z85].
221. H.R. 6395, Sec 513.
222. William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2021, Pub. L. No. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388 (2021).
223. See generally Brown, supra note 36, at 23.
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the executive’s use of the National Guard in Title 32 status without
confining these units to a rigid statutory standard.
Perhaps, Congress’s strongest power to restrict the executive is the
“power of the purse,” especially with respect to the misuse of military
personnel. 224 The recent reform by Representative Sherrill is made under
legislation for the fiscal budget of the DoD, as have most amendments to
Section 502(f).225
A restriction of the executive budget could
disincentivize the President or Secretary of Defense from authorizing or
requesting the National Guard in Title 32 status. As Title 32 status is
funded by the federal government, the fewer funds available, the less likely
the executive will propose or accept a request for Title 32 status.
Therefore, if Congress were to limit the DoD budget, the executive may be
deterred in authorizing missions to perform civil law enforcement functions
when more salient emergencies, like national disasters, are likely to arise.
Second, Congress could amend the PCA to include operations conducted
by the National Guard when requested by the executive under Title 32.
This proposal may provide the flexibility praised by scholars while
ensuring the National Guard in Title 32 status could not be improperly used
by the federal government. The PCA’s purpose is to prevent federal troops
from conducting civil law enforcement unless under specific
circumstances.226 By including missions by Title 32 National Guard units
when requested by the executive branch in the PCA, this law will continue
to prevent the federal government from using militarized troops to enforce
domestic law. This reform will continue to exclude a governor’s request
for Title 32 status from the PCA, which is consistent with the law’s
objectives. This amendment would also allow for the flexibility of using
Title 32 troops to respond to novel emergencies as the “other duty”
language would continue to allow the executive to use their discretion in
authorizing the National Guard in Title 32 status.
In addition to these amendments, the D.C. Mayor should be granted
authority over the DCNG like a state governor’s power over their
respective National Guard units. Unlike other governors, the D.C. Mayor
can only use the DCNG if the executive branch provides express

224. Gary Felicetti & John Luce, The Posse Comitatus Act: Setting the Record Straight
on 124 Years of Mischief and Misunderstanding Before Any More Damage Is Done, 175
MIL. L. REV. 86, 170 (2003).
225. See supra note 219.
226. See, e.g., JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42669, THE POSSE COMITATUS
ACT
AND
RELATED
MATTERS:
A
SKETCH
2–3
(2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42669.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WCZ-7U5T] (listing statutory
and constitutional exceptions to the PCA).
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authorization.227 Given that the capital is increasingly experiencing more
and more protests,228 granting the D.C. Mayor authorization to use the
DCNG can enhance the safety of D.C. residents, protesters, and law
enforcement. The most recent invasion of the Capitol demonstrates the
need for this reform. As the Mayor was powerless to deploy the DCNG,
the executive’s delay in doing so resulted in a prolonged invasion of the
Capitol and serious injuries and fatalities.229 Although there is a timely
debate on whether D.C. should be granted statehood,230 Title 32 does not
differentiate between the National Guard of recognized states and D.C
except in allowing the control of the DCNG to the DCNG commanding
general who is under the direct authority of the President.231 Therefore, the
D.C. Mayor should be recognized as a state governor for purposes of
activating the DCNG and keeping the DCNG semi-independent of the
executive branch. In doing so, the D.C. Mayor can act as a check on the
executive’s unfettered use of the DCNG and restrict the President’s ability
to find a legal loophole around the PCA. In addition, if the D.C. Mayor
were given authority to deploy the DCNG, the Capitol may have been
secured sooner, and lives could have been saved during the January 2021
invasion of the Capitol.
CONCLUSION
The National Guard is a unique embodiment of the United States
federalist structure. Whereas governors have the ultimate authority over
the National Guard in most cases, the federal government can regulate and

227. D.C. CODE § 49-103 (2021) (“When there is in the District of Columbia a tumult,
riot, mob, or a body of men acting together by force with attempt to commit a felony or to
offer violence to persons or property, or by force or violence to break and resist the laws, or
when such tumult, riot, or mob is threatened, it shall be lawful for the Mayor of the District
of Columbia, or for the United States Marshal for the District of Columbia, or for the
National Capital Service Director, to call on the Commander-in-Chief to aid them in
suppressing such violence and enforcing the laws . . . .”).
228. Marissa J. Lang, D.C. Is Becoming a Protest Battleground. In a Polarized Nation,
Experts Say That’s Unlikely to Change., WASH. POST (Jan. 1, 2021, 7:08 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/washington-dc-protests/2021/01/01/da743c20-4a6811eb-839a-cf4ba7b7c48c_story.html [https://perma.cc/JN55-8474].
229. See Read & Hennessy-Fiske, supra note 6.
230. See, e.g., Zachary B. Wolf, Why DC Should (And Should Not) Be the 51st State,
CNN (June 26, 2020, 8:09 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/26/politics/dc-statehood101/index.html [https://perma.cc/53ZD-GGVV].
231. See 32 U.S.C. § 325 (providing that the commanding general of the DCNG may
consent to duty status of the DCNG). Section 101 of Title 32 defines “National Guard” as
comprising of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard. Each definition of
Army and Air National Guard includes the organized militias of the District of Columbia.
See id. § 101. DCNG’s Major General reports directly to the President. See DCNG, 2019
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 200.
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utilize these units. This Note has argued that the executive branch has
extensively used National Guard members under Title 32 status based on
its interpretation of Section 502(f). Although contending that the statute
may provide limitations on the executive, this Note claims that the
executive interpretation will prevail under the Court’s strong deference to
the executive over military affairs. Given the executive’s broad power
under this expansive interpretation of Section 502(f), the President can
deploy out-of-state National Guard units into cities and towns without local
permission. As a governor’s approval is easily acquired, the President can
utilize these National Guard units to conduct missions to the detriment of
local citizens, especially those residing in Washington D.C.
The National Guard has been instrumental in responding to national
emergencies. Such units provided tremendous support after the September
11 attacks, Hurricane Katrina, and recently during the COVID-19
pandemic. It would be impossible to expect any level of government to
predict future catastrophes. The year 2020 is evidence enough to show the
need for flexible standards in using the National Guard. Although this
Note has advocated for more restrictions on the Title 32 status, it has
encouraged restrictions that leave a flexible standard for the National
Guard to respond to novel emergencies. It would be equally dangerous to
constrict the National Guard to a role where state and federal government
are unsure whether the National Guard could be legally deployed. Scholars
have often criticized the delayed federal response in deploying the military
to Hurricane Katrina caused by the executive branch’s internal debates over
the legality behind such actions.232 Perhaps during the most recent
invasion of the Capitol, the five lives lost could have been prevented by a
swift National Guard deployment. When lives are at stake, a hesitant
reaction due to confusing legal standards can be disastrous.
Although the executive could use such National Guard members in cities
without local approval, a practice that has not yet been implemented by the
executive branch in a major city besides the capital, President Trump’s
actions indicate that to rely on historical patterns to regulate military use is
irresponsible. Where entrenched precedent persuades our understanding,
society must question whether there is positive law to prevent disastrous
outcomes. Without doing so, we may lay the groundwork for future
transgressions that are permissible wrongs yet could have been seamlessly
prevented. Although the law remains, a new President may be elected

232. See, e.g., Candidus Dougherty, While the Government Fiddled Around, the Big Easy
Drowned: How the Posse Comitatus Act Became the Government’s Alibi for the Hurricane
Katrina Disaster, 29 N. Ill. U. L. REV. 117, 136 (2008); Stephen M. Griffin, Stop
Federalism Before it Kills Again: Reflections on Hurricane Katrina, 21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 527, 537–38 (2007).
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every four years. The United States would be unwise to rely on one person
to ensure precedent is followed. Rather, advocating for the enactment of
positive law would ensure precedent becomes law and future calamity is
avoided.

